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“Rethinking Ruddick and the ethnocentrism critique of Maternal Thinking” 
In the early 1990s, Sara Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking, was criticized for harboring a 
latent ethnocentrism.  Ruddick responded to these critiques in the 1995 edition of her book, but 
her response has not yet been addressed in the feminist philosophical literature. This essay 
addresses this lacuna in the feminist-philosophical scholarship. 
In the last installment of this critique, Alison Bailey and Patrice DiQuinzio suggested that 
the only way for Ruddick to avoid the ethnocentrism charge would require her near 
universalistic claims about mothering be rejected in favor of “particularized, localized accounts 
of mothering”.  In this essay I’ll show that this claim goes too far.  After reviewing Lugones’ and 
Bailey’s critiques of Ruddick, along with Ruddick’s response, I propose a “modified 
universalism” which addresses the concerns raised by Ruddick’s critics while preserving key 
elements of her theory.   
 
At the height of the feminist essentialism debates in the early 1990s, Sara Ruddick’s now 
classic contribution to feminist philosophy, Maternal Thinking, was criticized for harboring a 
latent ethnocentrism.  Ruddick responded to these critiques in the 1995 edition of her book, but 
her response has not yet been addressed in the feminist philosophical literature. This essay 
addresses this lacuna in the scholarship. It also presents an alternative response to the 
ethnocentrism charge than that envisioned by Ruddick’s primary critics. In the last installment of 
this critique, Alison Bailey and Patrice DiQuinzio suggested that the only way for Ruddick to 
avoid the ethnocentrism charge would require her near universalistic claims about mothering be 
rejected in favor of “particularized, localized accounts of mothering” (DiQuinzio, 11).  In this 
essay I’ll argue that Ruddick’s critics go too far when they suggest that, in order to acknowledge 
racial ethnic differences in maternal practices, we must abandon universalism altogether.  After 
reviewing Maria Lugones’ and Alison Bailey’s critiques of Ruddick, along with Ruddick’s 
response, I propose a “modified universalism” that addresses the concerns raised by Ruddick’s 
critics while preserving central tenets of her theory.  By developing a taxonomy that attends both 
to similarities and differences among maternal practices, the modified universalism proposed in 
this essay provides a theoretical framework for developing a richer and more complex 
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understanding of mothering, one that integrates insights from Sara Ruddick and Alison 
Bailey/Patricia Hill Collins. This improved understanding promises to help maternal 
practitioners identify new sites for cooperation, with promising implications for both mothering 
and peace politics.  
In their now classic 1983 article, “Have We Got a Theory for You!,” Maria Lugones and 
Elizabeth Spelman observe that “it is only possible for a woman who does not feel highly 
vulnerable with respect to other parts of her identity, e.g. race, class, ethnicity, religion, sexual 
alliance, etc., to conceive of her voice simply or essentially as a ‘woman’s voice.’” (476)  One 
year later Ruddick published her essay “Maternal Thinking” and five years after that, Ruddick 
published Maternal Thinking.  In both works, Ruddick extrapolates from her own experiences of 
mothering to develop a general account of maternal practice, which she thinks is applicable to all 
mothers.  Central to this account is Ruddick’s depiction of practices, which she defines as 
“collective human activities distinguished by the aims that identify them and by the consequent 
demands made on practitioners committed to those aims.”  For Ruddick “the aims or goals that 
define a practice are so central or ‘constitutive’ that in the absence of the goal you would not 
have the practice” (1989, 13-14, emphasis added). According to Ruddick three goals are central 
to and constitutive of all maternal practice: preservative love, the protective work mothers 
engage in to ensure their children’s survival; fostering growth, the work done to nurture “a 
child’s developing spirit” including her “emotional, cognitive, sexual and social development” 
(Ruddick 1989, 82-3); and socialization for acceptance, “training a child to be the kind of person 
whom others accept and whom the mothers themselves can actively appreciate” (104).  
In moving so easily between her experiences and those of mothers generally, Ruddick 
seems to engage in exactly the kind of slippage Lugones and Spelman warn about, mistaking her 
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mothering experiences for those of mothers in general.  Indeed, Ruddick’s work was soon 
explicitly identified as exemplifying a latent ethnocentrism characteristic of much of white 
feminist theory (Lugones 1991/2003, Bailey, 1994 a and b and 1995, DiQuinzio 1993).  For 
example, Maria Lugones reads “Maternal Thinking” as recognizing the so-called “problem of 
difference” raised by women of color while still not adequately recognizing difference itself 
(1991/2003, 68).  Ruddick acknowledges the “problem of difference” through use of a 
disclaimer. She identifies her own social location as a white, heterosexual, Protestant, well-
educated woman and acknowledges that “she is working within ‘the limits of her own particular 
social and sexual history’” (Ruddick, 1984: 215, as quoted in Lugones, 1991/2003, 69). Ruddick, 
however, then develops a theory that is intended to be applicable to all mothers, thereby leaving 
women from other social locations (Lugones’ primary concern here is with women of color) 
outside of her work and in the position of having to decide whether or not Ruddick’s theory 
applies to them and how her theory might need to be modified in order to be made useful. Audre 
Lorde aptly describes the situation women of color find themselves in when she observes “How 
difficult and time-consuming it is to have to reinvent the pencil every time you want to send a 
message” (Lorde, 35; as quoted in Spelman, 116).What Ruddick’s disclaimer lacks, according to 
Lugones, is an interactive component. Through use of the disclaimer, Ruddick tries to insulate 
her theory from criticisms made of it by women who inhabit subject positions different than 
Ruddick’s, rather than to actively engage these criticisms and, through them, these women’s 
lives and experiences. When the disclaimer is used, women of color are still faced with Lorde’s 
dilemma: having to reinvent existing feminist accounts of mothering before they can speak their 
own truths about mothering. Lugones sees Ruddick as typical of white feminist theorists in that 
4 
 
she seems more intent on protecting the integrity of her theory than addressing and overcoming 
the problem of racism (69-70).  
While Lugones’ charges are directed towards Ruddick’s 1983 essay, and not her 1989 
book, there’s reason to believe Lugones would similarly criticize Ruddick’s book. For one, 
Ruddick makes use of the criticized disclaimer in her book as well, stating that “the peculiarities 
of my experience affect my fundamental conceptions of maternal thinking and work” and then 
developing a theory of mothering grounded in her own experiences (1989/1995, 54).  Moreover, 
when Bailey and DiQuinzio expand upon Lugones’ criticisms, they have Ruddick’s book in 
mind.  In her elaboration of the ethnocentrism critiques in the mid 1990s Alison Bailey suggests 
that Ruddick conflates two voices—one emergies from Ruddick’s personal experience, the other 
is the voice of the near-universal moral theorist.  By conflating these two voices, Ruddick lets 
her own experience stand in for the experience of mothers in general, thereby marginalizing the 
experiences of women from social locations different than her own.   
I recently reread Ruddick’s initial article and book with the above criticisms in mind.  In 
her initial article, Ruddick’s use of the ideas of non-white women consists in a footnote in which 
she acknowledges the influence of Audre Lorde (and white working class author, Tillie Olson) 
on her thinking about mothering (1983, 228, footnote 5). Yet in the text of her 1989 book, 
Ruddick repeatedly refers to the ideas and experiences of women of color.  For example, 
Ruddick refers to the images of mothering depicted by Toni Cade Bambera, Gloria Naylor, 
Bernice Johnson, Kamla Bhasin, and others.  In the part of her book devoted to feminist peace 
politics, Ruddick describes the challenges of maternal love using the prose of Chinua Achebe, 
the experience of mothering in the wake of Hiroshima, and discusses the antimilitarism of 
mothers from Argentina and Chile. Despite incorporating the experiences of mothers of different 
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races and nationalities in her book, Bailey and DiQuinzio still criticize Maternal Thinking for 
being ethnocentric.  Why? The main components of Ruddick’s account of mothering were 
developed in her 1983 essay.  While Ruddick finds cross-cultural supporting evidence from 
literature and history to incorporate into her book, her chosen examples don’t challenge the basic 
concepts developed in 1983.  To return to Lorde’s metaphor, the pencil Ruddick offers to 
maternal theorists is now painted in a variety of colors, but it is still fundamentally the same 
writing implement.  And if it was inappropriate for analyzing the mothering experiences of 
women of color in her 1983 essay, it is still inappropriate in her 1989 book. Lugones makes this 
same point, in somewhat different words. She states “When I do not see plurality stressed in the 
very structure of a theory, I know that I will have to do lots of acrobatics—lie a contortionist or 
tight-rope walker—to have this theory speak to me without allowing the theory to distort me in 
my complexity”  (2003, 74).  Ruddick’s account of maternal thinking, as developed in her 1989 
book, is still suspected of distorting the experiences of racial ethnic mothers. 
In the next two sections of this essay I examine first Ruddick’s published response to 
early versions of the ethnocentrism critique and then Alison Bailey’s later, more detailed 
criticisms of Maternal Thinking. By better appreciating what Ruddick’s theory purportedly lacks, 
I clear the way for determining, in the final sections of this essay, whether and how it can be  
redeemed. While Ruddick’s written response to the ethnocentrism critique is ultimately found 
wanting, her theory itself, when sympathetically reworked, is able to address her critics’ 
concerns.  
Ruddick’s Response to the Ethnocentrism Critique 
In her preface to the 1995 edition of Maternal Thinking, Ruddick responds to the 
ethnocentrism critique. Curiously, Ruddick doesn’t respond to articles that address her work 
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directly. Rather, she takes up Angela Harris’s article, “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory,” which addresses the writings of feminist legal theorists, Catharine MacKinnon and 
Robin West (1990). <1> Harris argues that MacKinnon and West fail adequately to recognize the 
distinctiveness of black women’s experiences. Black women’s experiences are not simply 
quantitatively different from white women’s experiences, Harris argues, they’re qualitatively 
different. Thus the “intensifier” view, that if white women have it bad, black women must have it 
even worse, fails to capture black women’s lived reality.  Harris uses Toni Morrison’s novel, The 
Bluest Eye, to argue that  
beauty itself is white. … There is a difference between the hope that the next makeup kit 
or haircut or diet will bring you salvation and the knowledge that nothing can.  The 
relation of black women to the ideal of white beauty is not a more intense form of white 
women’s frustration:  It is something other, a complex mingling of racial and gender 
hatred from without, self-hatred from within (246). 
Similarly, Harris argues that white and black women have qualitatively different experiences of 
rape.  She points out that while the law has inadequately protected white women from rape, 
during slavery it granted black women no legal protection whatsoever.  Indeed, rape of slave 
women worked to the advantage of slave-owners, by adding valuable fair-skinned slave children 
to their list of assets.  And after slavery, Harris notes, rape laws were rarely invoked to penalize 
rapists of black women, as black women were seen as “promiscuous by nature.”  Within this 
historical context, Harris observes, rape “was something that only happened to white women; 
what happened to black women was simply life” (247).  In addition, through creation of the myth 
of the black male rapist, unforgettably portrayed in the early motion picture film, “The Birth of a 
Nation,” rape was used as a tool of racial oppression that controlled black men as well as black 
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women. <2> The implication here is clear: due to qualitative differences between black and 
white women’s experiences, illustrated by Harris through the examples of racial differences both 
in beauty standards and in social meanings attached to rape, extrapolating from white women’s 
experiences to all women distorts the experiences of black women by ignoring salient and 
distinctive features of their oppression.  By addressing the Harris essay in her 1995 preface, 
Ruddick clearly indicates that she sees Harris’s critique as potentially applicable to her own 
account of mothering. She seems to be asking herself: perhaps there are qualitative differences in 
white and black women’s experiences of mothering that her theory needs to address?   How does 
Ruddick respond to this possibility?  
In her 1995 preface Ruddick addresses together criticisms of her theory for failing to 
address issues related to mothering disabled children and for failing to address differences in 
maternal practice grounded in racial/ethnic difference (xiv-xvii). Ruddick sees both black 
mothers and mothers of disabled children as sharing in common that their children are 
stigmatized and marginalized by predominant and exclusive conceptions of what constitutes the 
“normal” child and worries that mothers may internalize these views, to the detriment of their 
maternal practice and, ultimately, their children (xv). Ruddick’s suggested strategy to deal with 
this stigmatization is to engage in universalization by insisting on these children’s humanity. “I 
am tempted to say that the conception of a human child, or of all children as human, is an 
antistigmatizing act” (xvi).  Ruddick is aware that her critics see universalism as problematic, the 
source of stigma not the solution to it.  She reports that her readers warn, “the fictional human 
child contributes to the stigmatizing of some children as other than ‘standard human’ and thereby 
ignores, distorts, or exacerbates the particular struggles of their mothers” (xvi). After identifying 
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some of the ways that children differ from each other, both within a family and within a culture, 
Ruddick responds 
Yet I continue to universalize—or perhaps more accurately, to moralize.  I am not so 
much interested in crosscultural psychological claims about how children are—though 
these would have more of a place in a book I would write today.  My primary concern is 
with moral claims about the responses children deserve (xvi, emphasis added).   
With this quote, Ruddick seems to reduce the concerns of her critics to matters of cross-cultural 
psychology, which she then dismisses as tangential to the normative project of Maternal 
Thinking.  I find Ruddick’s response striking given that in a footnote to her 1983 essay Ruddick 
states that she is “dependent on others, morally as well as intellectually, for the statement of 
differences, the assessment of their effects on every aspect of maternal lives, and finally for 
radical correction as well as for expansion of any general theory I would offer” (footnote 5, 228).  
Ruddick seems to read Harris as offering just such a “radical correction” (otherwise, why address 
Harris’s article in her new preface?), and yet she quickly dismisses Harris’s concerns. Why? 
Let me try to clarify Ruddick’s meaning, in order to shed light on this issue. In her 
response to Harris, Ruddick suggests that her normative analysis operates at a high level of 
abstraction; it seeks to identify what concerns children share in common and not how they differ; 
it is in these commonalities that Ruddick expects to ground an account of the moral obligations 
due to children.  It’s for this reason that Ruddick thinks racial ethnic permutations of maternal 
practice belong to the area of cross-cultural psychology rather than moral philosophy proper—
her theory isn’t concerned with culturally specific interpretations of children’s needs. Hence, 
Ruddick does not think the ethnocentrism critique necessitates a rethinking of her core ideas 
because it operates at the wrong level of analysis.   
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While this attempted reconstruction of Ruddick tries to make sense of her line of 
argument, it opens up new questions.  Ruddick is a standpoint theorist who believes all 
knowledge is situated.  Yet she rejects racial ethnic differences in children as a matter of 
theoretically irrelevant cross-cultural psychology rather than as theoretically relevant social 
context that helps mothering theory avoid the much criticized abstraction of dominant ways of 
knowing (1989, 127-39).  Ruddick does not dwell on this concern long enough to explain how 
she proposes to distinguish between those details that do and those that do not properly belong to 
the domain of theory.  I return to this point in “Rethinking Ruddick’s Universalism”, below. 
Ruddick’s reasons for rejecting the ethnocentrism critique shift in her final comments on 
this issue, when she reiterates her approach to writing her book “I offer my own variant of 
maternal thinking as the product of a particular white and gentile woman’s experience… I 
recognize that my conception of the human child as singular and complex is a product of my 
culture and history…”  Here Ruddick seems to acknowledge that her perspective on mothering, 
is culturally specific and thus, presumably, limited. Ruddick ends this passage with the words 
“But I can at most only curb not eliminate universalizing tendencies in my own history” (xvii, 
emphasis added).  Here Ruddick invokes a different kind of universalism than that previously 
discussed.  Rather than universalism being the goal of her normative analysis, and the solution to 
the stigmatization that can stem from marginal identities, here Ruddick invokes a kind of “false” 
universalism that unwittingly sneaks into her narrative, causing her to extrapolate from her 
specific social location to all mothers.  Where in Ruddick’s analysis does universalism as the 
legitimate aim of normative analysis end and “false” universalism that presents a partial 
perspective as generally shared begin?  Ruddick doesn’t provide us with the tools to know.  
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Ruddick ends her discussion of disability and ethnocentrism by expressing her gratitude to the 
many mothers who tell maternal stories different than her own.  
Lugones would describe Ruddick’s response to the ethnocentrism critique as non-
interactive (2003, 68ff.).  In her discussion of the ethnocentrism critique, Ruddick doesn’t 
address Lugones or DiQuinzio, her primary critics at the time of her 1995 introduction.  And 
while Ruddick does seem to see that Harris’s critique of MacKinnon and West may be applicable 
to her own work, she effectively sweeps Harris’s concerns off the table by relegating them to the 
sphere of “crosscultural psychology.”  Clearly, Ruddick does not think there are substantive, 
qualitative differences between the maternal practices of black and white women. Rather, her 
view seems to be that black and white women offer cultural variations on the same near universal 
goals that guide maternal practice.  Thus, she sees no reason to rethink the central tenets of her 
theory. 
Ruddick’s reluctant response to this critique contrasts sharply with her response to the 
disability critique, in the very same pages.  Ruddick observes that Jane McDonnell, a mother-
author of disabled children, and Nancy Scheper-Hughes, an anthropologist who studied the 
maternal practices of poor women in Brazil, “inspire me to revise Maternal Thinking—both its 
fundamental concepts and its details” (xvi).  No such observation is made regarding the feminist 
authors who launch the ethnocentrism critique. This difference in uptake on two critiques 
Ruddick sees as closely related is remarkable.  It’s made more remarkable by Ruddick’s 
subsequent comments on the disability critique in her 2002 review of Eva Kittay’s book, Love’s 
Labor. Ruddick observes “Kittay says, as others have, that I wrote of mothering as if all children 
were ‘intact.’”  She is pointing out a conceptual flaw and a failure of imagination I will try to 
remedy.”  (Ruddick 2002, 222; emphasis added)  She then goes on to accept Kittay’s 
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recommendation that “the ability to foster the capacity to experience joy” should be 
acknowledged as a “primary ideal of mothering that well serves both mothers and children”.  
(222)  Here, Ruddick both acknowledges and responds to an interactive demand made by her 
critics; consideration of the disability critique has led her to see shortcomings in her thinking and 
to accept an addition to the central tenets of her theory. The ethnocentrism and disability 
critiques, which Ruddick initially treats as comparable, get very different uptake in the new 
edition of Maternal Thinking and in her subsequent writing.  
I have given considerable thought as to why Ruddick would respond so differently to 
these two critiques, which she clearly sees as related.  The easy answer is that this is evidence of 
Ruddick’s own unreflective ethnocentrism. While I cannot rule out this possibility, in the spirit 
of the principle of charity I’d like to propose an alternative explanation. The Harris, Lugones, 
and DiQuinzio critiques raise general, theoretical, and abstract concerns about problems of 
inclusion and exclusion in feminist thought.  They don’t identify specific shortcomings in 
Ruddick’s analysis of mothering but leave Ruddick to identify and rectify such shortcomings on 
her own. By contrast, the disability critiques made by McDonnell, Scheper-Hughes, and Kittay 
provide concrete, real life examples of differences in the needs of abled versus disabled children 
and provide specific examples of how these differences require an addition to Ruddick’s 
proposed three goals of maternal practice.  My hypothesis is that, absent similar concrete 
examples provided by her primary critics that illustrated the distinctive needs of children of 
color, it was easier for Ruddick to dismiss the possibility that the ethnocentrism critique affected 
her core ideas.  
I submit that if issues of disability are properly philosophical and raise normative 
concerns that meaningfully add to Ruddick’s account of maternal thinking, there is no prima 
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facie reason to reject the possibility that other types of maternal practice, such as that carried out 
by women of color, similarly raise philosophical and ethical concerns that would also add to her 
account. We see an attempt to demonstrate how much we have to learn from racial ethnic 
women’s maternal practice in the work of Alison Bailey. Bailey’s use of Patricia Hill Collins’ 
writings provides a model account of an interactive white feminist response to the ethnocentrism 
critique.  As we’ll see, while Ruddick uses examples of mothering by women of color to support 
her claims about maternal practice, Bailey uses Collins’ analysis to complicate white feminist 
views on mothering.  While Ruddick emphasizes sameness, Bailey attends to differences. 
Bailey’s Use of Collins’ Motherwork Goals 
After providing a thoughtful overview of the problem, within feminist theory, of 
illegitimately extrapolating from white heterosexual middle class women’s experiences to all 
women, Bailey uses Patricia Hill Collins’ essay, “Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist 
Theorizing About Motherhood,” and her book, Black Feminist Thought, to describe three goals 
internal to racial ethnic women’s motherwork.  
1) Motherwork and physical survival.  This goal seeks both the survival of the individual 
child and that of the racial ethnic community itself.  Racial ethnic mothers try to secure their 
children’s physical and psychological survival within a hostile society in which U.S. black 
children face higher mortality rates than white children, and black, Hispanic, and Native 
American children all experience elevated poverty rates (1994, 201).   In Black Feminist Thought 
Collins argues that black mothers pursuing this maternal goal must raise their children to know 
what behaviors are socially acceptable, so that they can better protect themselves.  Newspaper 
columnist Deborah Mathis described well this aspect of black mothering years ago, when she 
recounted how she taught her teenage son always to keep his hands in plain view, when inside a 
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store, lest he be accused of shoplifting or be thought to be hiding a gun.    At the same time, 
Collins describes how racial ethnic mothers also teach their children to exceed society’s 
stereotypical expectations for them.   
2) Motherwork and identity. With this goal, racial ethnic mothers try to develop in their 
children both a positive sense of racial ethnic identity and the capacity for developing their own 
self-definition, while living in a white dominant society that “devalues their history, work, 
culture, and customs” (Bailey, 1994b, 193-94). Drawing on the work of Bonnie Thornton Dill, 
Collins provides the example of black women domestic workers who sought to convey to their 
children values and skills that would allow them to achieve higher social positions than their 
mothers (1994, 125). This dual aspect of black maternal practice, namely socializing black 
children for acceptance into white society while simultaneously teaching them to resist white 
norms, is captured well by this quote from historian Elsa Barkley Brown: “[my] mother’s 
behavior demonstrated the ‘need to teach me to live my life one way and, at the same time, to 
provide all the tools I would need to live it quite differently’” (Brown, 1989, 929, as quoted in 
Collins 1994, 124).  
3) Motherwork and power. Collins depicts motherwork as exceptionally challenging for 
racial ethnic women who already face multiple oppressions themselves.  She states that 
motherwork for physical survival “often extracts a high cost for large numbers of women.  There 
is loss of individual autonomy and there is submersion of individual growth for the benefit of the 
group.  While this dimension of motherwork remains essential, the question of women doing 
more than their fair share of such work for individual and community development merits open 
debate” (1994, 201).  Motherwork for identity requires that racial ethnic mothers resist the 
dominant culture’s attempt to compel them to be complicit in their children’s assimilation to 
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stereotypical racialized views, such as “Pocahonteses” or “squaws” for Native American girls; 
“geisha girls” or “Suzy Wongs” for Asian girls; “Madonnas” or “whores” for Hispanic girls; or 
“mammies”, “matriarchs” and “prostitutes” for African American girls (1994, 208-9).  Thus, the 
third Collins/Bailey motherwork goal is that racial ethnic mothers engage in self-definition, self-
valuation, and self-empowerment themselves so that, despite economic and racial exploitation, 
they can make their own choices about mothering and, thereby, meet the needs of their children 
and communities (Bailey, 1994 b, 193-4; see Collins 1994, 204-7).  This goal seems to emerge 
out of Collins’ relational understanding of mothering—the maternal challenges faced by racial 
ethnic women are so significant, that the goal of maternal empowerment must be an explicit goal 
of racial ethnic women’s motherwork practice if they are to achieve their other, child centered 
maternal goals. Bailey presents Collins’ three goals as alternatives to Ruddick’s. 
Bailey and Ruddick exhibit significant differences in how they utilize the ideas of women 
of color. Whereas Ruddick uses their ideas to find supporting evidence for her own views, Bailey 
begins her theorizing about mothering with a close reading of Patricia Hill Collins. Rather than 
impose her own categories upon racial ethnic women’s experiences, Bailey imports categories 
directly from Collins’ analysis of these stories and brings them into conversation with Ruddick.  
Finally, following Collins, Bailey uses race, class, and gender, as categories of analysis, which 
allows her to develop a more nuanced and differentiated account of how power and inequality 
shape racial ethnic maternal practices.  
I find compelling Bailey’s close reading of Collins to advance an alternative account of 
maternal practice that is attentive to the intersections of race, gender, and socio-economic class. 
And I am sympathetic to the concern she and others raise regarding an “intellectual division of 
labor” in which white women develop the theories and women of color provide the stories that 
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support them (1994, 195). <3> Yet while Ruddick doesn’t go far enough in responding to the 
ethnocentrism critique, I worry that Bailey goes too far by suggesting that feminist theorists must 
eschew universalism altogether if they are to do justice to the variety of maternal experiences.  
Angela Harris makes an observation within the realm of feminist legal theory that is relevant 
here as well; she reminds us that “even a jurisprudence based on multiple consciousness must 
categorize; without categorization each individual is as isolated as Funes < 4>, and there can be 
no moral responsibility or social change (239).” I understand Harris as making two claims here. 
The first is epistemological and the second is normative. 1) Human thinking functions by way of 
categorizing; we cannot give up categorization or else we’d be left with disparate, disconnected, 
and hence incomprehensible experiences that we could not fully understand ourselves and we 
certainly could not communicate to others.  When we apply Harris’ reasoning to mothering in 
particular, we see that if we eschewed universal categories, we’d have information on specific 
local mothering practices, but would have no way of putting these practices in relation to each 
other.  Not only would this impede our understanding of other women’s maternal practices, it 
would also impede knowledge of our own. 2) Harris is making a normative claim with her 
concluding words “there can be no moral responsibility or social change.”  I read her as saying 
that even if we could eschew categorizing, we wouldn’t want to.  The kinds of comparisons and 
analyses categorizing makes possible allow us to make moral judgments and thereby lay the 
foundation for social change.  For example, by defining oppression and then being able to 
demonstrate that x, like y, is an instance of oppression, I’ve used categories and categorization to 
make comparisons that allow for moral judgment (x, like y, is an instance of oppression and thus 
is wrong) and social change (we need laws to change x, just like we have already passed laws to 
remedy y).  
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Harris’ suggestion is that rather than resist categorization or generalization altogether, we 
need to change the status of the categories we use, we should “make our categories explicit, 
tentative, relational, and unstable.”  (239)  In the rest of this essay, I will use Harris’s theoretical 
suggestions and Bailey’s/Collins’ description of racial ethnic mothering, to propose a 
reconstruction of Ruddick that, I hope, provides a more satisfactory response to the 
ethnocentrism critique than does Ruddick or Bailey.  I will proceed by carving a middle path 
between Ruddick’s universalism and the localized accounts of mothering advocated by Bailey 
and DiQuinzio.  In keeping with Harris’s suggestion above, the new categories I introduce 
should be understood as provisional and subject to change, as new voices contribute to our 
understanding of mothering. 
Rethinking Ruddick’s Universalism 
Recall: Ruddick describes mothering as a practice and then defines practices as 
“collective human activities distinguished by the aims that identify them and by the consequent 
demands made on practitioners committed to those aims.  The aims or goals that define a 
practice are so central or ‘constitutive’ that in the absence of the goal you would not have that 
practice” (1989, 13-14).  Ruddick argues her three proposed goals are constitutive of all maternal 
practice.  They emerge from the demands children place on their caregivers. By contrast, Bailey 
argues against universal goals by demonstrating that within the U.S. racial ethnic maternal 
practice is guided by its own separate and distinctive set of constitutive goals (1994b, 193). 
I think these views are not as incompatible as it at first seems, once we shift our attention 
to an examination of the different types of goals that guide maternal practice. Again, following 
Harris’ suggestions, any initial assignation of maternal goals to one of these types must be 
considered tentative and subject to revision, as the voices of mothers from diverse backgrounds 
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and with diverse mothering experiences are included in the conversation. (Here I’m thinking not 
only of poor women and women of color, but also adoptive mothers and birthmothers who 
relinquish their children for adoption).   
Some goals are universal, they’re internal to all forms of maternal practice, yet get 
interpreted in culturally specific ways. Linda Alcoff understands Ruddick in this way, which is 
why she doesn’t believe Ruddick’s theory is ethnocentric.  Of the goals of maternal practice, 
Alcoff observes “She [Ruddick] suggests that if these are defined loosely enough we might apply 
them across cultures, but in the main her project is wisely to do a very particular ethnography of 
the maternal practices she herself knows best” (78).  Ruddick is correct that preservative love is 
such a universal goal; without it, there would be no child and hence, no maternal practice to 
discuss.  For privileged mothers, concern about whether their children will survive the day is a 
concern that fades into the background of their daily maternal practice, as children grow out of 
their vulnerable infant stage and mothers become more experienced and confident. Such 
concerns, though, can quickly erupt when a car speeds too quickly down the street or information 
is disseminated about a pedophile moving into the community. Economically and socially 
disadvantaged mothers’ ongoing and pervasive concern with ensuring their children’s survival, a 
maternal goal discussed by both Collins and Bailey, is a culturally specific form of Ruddick’s 
near universal goal of preservative love.  It’s the form preservative love takes under situations of 
oppression, when a mother can no longer blithely assume that the surrounding community is, by 
and large, benevolently disposed towards (or at least not openly antagonistic towards) her child.  
I see the maternal goal of ensuring children’s survival under oppression as being 
achieved through aiming at intermediate goals.  For example, mothers of racial ethnic children 
pursue the intermediate goal of teaching their children to understand, anticipate, and respond to 
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racism.  If it weren’t for the social context of racism, this intermediate goal would not need to 
exist.  Yet, given this context, failure to pursue this maternal goal threatens the physical safety, 
self-esteem, and well-being of children of color. Likewise, mothers of non-gender conforming 
children pursue a similar intermediate goal when they teach their children to understand, 
anticipate, and respond to homophobia and trans-phobia.  Different maternal strategies can be 
utilized to achieve these constitutive goals. As already discussed, one strategy racial ethnic 
mothers employ when pursuing this goal is to teach their children socially acceptable behavior, 
as does black mother-columnist Deborah Mathis.  Mothers of non-gender conforming children 
might utilize a strategy of teaching their children society’s gender norms so that their children 
can outwardly conform to these norms when in public, while celebrating their children’s self-
expression at home and when in other safe locations.  
As this brief discussion suggests, feminist understanding of the complexities of maternal 
practice and maternal thought is enhanced when we identify culturally specific variations of this 
universal goal. Here we have seen that the goals that guide the daily maternal practices of 
mothers of racial ethnic children and of gender non-conforming children share similarities with 
each other (both sets of mothers teach their children survival skills for dealing with a hostile 
social world), even as they differ greatly from the daily maternal practices of mothers of children 
who conform to regnant race and gender ideals. This improved descriptive account of mothering 
reveals an ethically significant fact: that social worlds which appear relatively benign to some 
mothers and children are experienced as hostile by others. It enhances the possibility of mutual 
understanding, respect, and support for mothers to be familiar with such similarities and 
differences between their daily maternal practices. Thus, rather than dismissing racial ethnic 
differences in maternal practice as a matter of cross-cultural psychology, the discussion here 
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suggests that Ruddick should view such differences as part of the philosophically relevant social 
context of mothering. As Ruddick herself warns us: “To abstract is to simplify complexity, in 
particular to reduce the manifold issues of moral life into dichotomous choices” (1989, 95).  To 
dismiss racial ethnic differences in maternal practice and maternal thinking as “matters of cross 
cultural psychology” is to engage in the very abstraction that Ruddick elsewhere rejects. 
A second group of goals, while universal and internal to all maternal practice, only 
becomes reflective and intentional—and hence thematized—for some groups of mothers.  <5> 
Thus, all families instill in their children a sense of ethnic-cultural identity.  Within the U.S., 
white parents of white children engage in this goal largely unconsciously and 
unproblematically—as the dominant culture provides many examples of historical figures, 
superheroes, fairytales, movies, books, and news media that positively portray persons of their 
ethnic-cultural identity.  By contrast, U.S. parents of children of color who wish to instill in their 
children a strong sense of self-esteem and pride must make cultivation of ethnic-cultural identity 
an explicit and intentional goal, as positive role models are scarce. The social context of racism 
results here in a qualitative difference in the maternal practices of mothers of white and non-
white children; the maternal practices of the latter group is guided by an additional explicit 
maternal goal. Cultivating a child’s capacity for joy would also belong to this second group of 
maternal goals.  As Eva Kittay suggests, cultivating this capacity is an important and intentional 
goal for mothers of severely disabled children but most parents don’t need to explicitly think 
about this goal. As these two examples demonstrate, by carefully examining non-dominant 
family forms, we may be able to identify goals of maternal practice internal to all maternal 
practice that would otherwise remain undiscovered.   
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A third type of maternal goal is, as Bailey claims, specific to and constitutive of some 
forms of maternal practice but not others.  With this claim, I depart from Ruddick, who rejects 
the notion that non-universalizable children’s demands can raise normative concerns (preface, 
xvi).  
Drawing on Patricia Hill Collins’ analysis, Bailey presents racial ethnic women’s efforts 
at self-empowerment as an example of this third type of maternal goal. Collins makes it clear 
that racial ethnic women face enormous challenges in carrying out their maternal practices. 
These challenges include a history of sterilization abuse,  past and current experiences of having 
wanted children removed by governmental authorities, and schools that denigrate the identity, 
culture and values African-American, Hispanic, Asian-American, and Native American mothers 
try to instill in their children (1994, 205-6).  Under situations of racial oppression, only self-
empowered racial ethnic mothers can hope approximately to realize the goals that guide their 
maternal practice. In addition, it seems plausible that even white mothers faced with oppressive 
life circumstances will have to strive for self-empowerment as a means to achieve their maternal 
goals.  For example, poor women of all races who are on welfare face social stereotypes that 
depict their maternal practices as inadequate.  As a result, they must learn how to respond to the 
intervention of social workers and other “experts” into their families.  Bailey is likely correct 
that, due to Ruddick’s relatively privileged social position, she was less likely to identify self-
empowerment as an explicit goal of maternal practice. 
But it is also true that in proposing self-empowerment as a maternal goal Bailey and 
Collins fundamentally challenge Ruddick’s theory.  Ruddick’s three proposed goals all focus on 
mothers meeting the demands made by their children.  While Ruddick occasionally describes 
how mothers change as a result of engaging in maternal work, none of her proposed goals of 
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maternal practice focus on the mother herself.  As Vrinda Dalmiya observed to me, in this regard 
Ruddick’s account of maternal practice isn’t relational <6>. Ruddick’s goals are all child-centric, 
not mother-centric, or relationship centric. I find compelling Collins’ description of 
empowerment as a relational goal that informs racial ethnic women’s motherwork.  Her 
relational approach promises to bring into feminist theorizing about motherhood theoretically, 
politically, and ethically valuable information about the distinctive challenges faced by mothers 
from various social locations, much as the intermediate goals, described above, did.  Thus, a 
relational view of maternal goals promises to help address Lugones’ concern that feminist theory 
should address the complexity of experience brought to the table by women of color (1994, 74). 
It would also be consistent with the relational emphasis so central to recent work in feminist 
ethics.   Ruddick herself, however, seems unlikely to accept Collins’/Bailey’s proposed goal of 
maternal empowerment because, for her, it has the wrong focus—mothers as compared to 
children. From the perspective of Ruddick’s theory, maternal empowerment appears to be a 
strategy pursued in order to achieve one of the child-centric goals described in Maternal 
Thinking.  
While I’m sympathetic to a relational account of the goals of maternal practice, a 
thorough consideration of such a view exceeds the scope of this essay.  <7> Thus, to make my 
point that some goals of maternal practice are specific to and constitutive of some forms of 
maternal practice but not others, I propose the following child centric goal:  helping children deal 
with loss and grief.  The particular setting I have in mind is adoptive mothers who aim to help 
their children deal with the loss and grief that typically accompanies adoption, although clearly 
other children (those who lose a parent or close family member through death or divorce or those 
who grew up in a war torn country) also must deal with loss and grief. Adoptive parents are 
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informed that adoptees typically grieve, from early childhood into adulthood, the loss of their 
birth families and in the case of transnational adoption, loss of birth country and birth culture.  
This sense of loss and grief can be triggered by events as varied as birthdays, Mother’s Day, or 
school assignments that ask students to trace their family tree. The sense of loss takes different 
forms at different developmental stages and may never be fully overcome. Adoptive parents do 
not so much try to help their children recover from this grief, which is why I see this as a goal 
distinctive from Ruddick’s goal of fostering growth. Rather they use the maternal virtue of 
attentive love (Ruddick 1989, 123) to attend to behaviors that may indicate the child is grieving 
and then they work to listen to and be present to their children, to affirm and validate their 
feelings (if not always their behaviors), so that their children feel validated, understood, and 
supported. Adoptive mothers who fail in this maternal goal put their child’s sense of well-being 
and her relationship with her adoptive family at risk; I find it likely that such failure also inhibits 
the adoptive mother’s ability to foster her child’s growth. 
The goals of maternal practice laid out thus far guide the project of raising one’s own 
children so that they can survive and grow.  This is in keeping with how Ruddick describes the 
goals of maternal practice. Yet reflection on the intermediate goals identified above, of teaching 
children of color to understand, anticipate, and respond to racism and teaching non-gender 
conforming children to understand, anticipate, and respond to homophobia and transphobia, 
suggests the possibility of a fourth and distinctive type of maternal goal, which would have a 
different grounding than the others.  In raising their children, mothers are aware of the unique, 
wonderful, challenging beings they are.  This awareness may make mothers especially well-
suited to use their moral imagination to recognize that other mothers’ children are also uniquely 
valuable.  If I am correct, this recognition can ground a different type of maternal goal—a 
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normative goal that emerges, not from the desire to enhance the flourishing of one’s own child, 
but out of the desire to ensure that other beloved children can also survive and flourish.  Mothers 
who learn about the maternal concerns, struggles, sorrows, successes, and practices of differently 
situated mothers, such as mothers of non-white or gender bending children, may be motivated to 
change their own maternal practices in order to support the maternal practices of these other 
mothers.  For example, white mothers of white children may be motivated to raise their children 
to be anti-racist and mothers of all races who have gender conforming children may be motivated 
to raise their children to be accepting of gender difference, as a way to help ensure that other 
mothers’ children will also be able to survive and flourish.  While more speculative than the 
other maternal goals I’ve described, the possibility of this fourth type of maternal goal 
underscores the ethical importance of mothers sharing their maternal stories. For the possibility 
of mutual understanding, support, and solidarity relies upon developing a more concrete, 
detailed, and embodied understanding of both the similarities and differences among maternal 
practices.  This essay has sought to develop a theoretical framework for such an account, by 
providing an initial, provisional description of four types of goals that guide maternal practice. 
***** 
In her article, “Mothers, Birthgivers, and Peacemakers: The Need for an Inclusive 
Account,” Alison Bailey observes “Given the diversity among maternal practitioners … it is 
questionable as to whether Ruddick can plausibly construct a complete picture of mothering 
work which leads to a cohesive account of ‘maternal thinking’ that accurately captures the 
variety of mothering work” (1994a, 275).  This observation seems on target.  Ruddick herself 
acknowledges that her list of maternal goals is incomplete (1989, 22), and her task in Maternal 
Thinking isn’t to demonstrate the variety of maternal practices but to illustrate the commonalities 
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among them.  As Bailey compellingly shows, and as I try to further demonstrate here, feminist 
understanding is enriched when we examine not just the commonalities, but also the differences 
among maternal practices, as it’s here that inequalities of power become visible, complexities of 
maternal thinking and practice become more evident, and the possibility of new coalitions among 
maternal practitioners arise. This essay has tried to carve a path between Ruddick and Bailey.  
By shifting the level of analysis, from a focus on specific goals that guide maternal practice to a 
consideration of different types of goals, we’re able to underscore Bailey’s point that an account 
of mothering that doesn’t examine different forms of maternal practice will be deficient, as it will 
overlook culturally inflected universal goals, intermediate goals, goals that are reflective and 
intentional only for some groups of mothers, and goals internal to local maternal practices. In 
addition, it was suggested that mothering theory that strives to address the complexities of 
maternal practice may be better served by a relational versus a child centric conception of the 
goals that guide maternal practice. While this essay complicates Ruddick’s account of mothering, 
such that it can better accommodate the mothering practices of a range of differently situated 
mothers, it also defends the central tenets of her theory by proposing and endorsing a modified 
universalism.   
Notes 
Together, the Associate Provost, Provost, and Faculty Development and Research Committee at 
the College of St. Benedict/St. John’s University provided the reassigned time that made this 
essay possible.  Thank you.  Many thanks are also owed to Kelly Rae Kraemer, Charles Wright, 
Sara Ruddick, Carla Johnson, Amy Hilden, and, especially, reader 1 at Hypatia for providing 
detailed comments on earlier versions of this essay.  Engaging their ideas significantly 
strengthened the final essay. Finally, I wish to express appreciation to my audiences at the 
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National Women’s Studies Association Meeting (spring 2008), Minnesota Philosophical Society 
Meeting (fall 2008), and Feminist Ethics and Social Theory Conference (fall 2009) for 
encouraging this work.   
<1>  When I asked Ruddick why she chose to write about Harris, her reply was that she was 
teaching Harris’s essay at the time she was writing her new introduction.  So it was the version 
of the ethnocentrism critique with which she was most immediately engaged.  Personal 
Communication, fall 2008. 
<2> See Andrea Smith’s Sexual violence as a tool of genocide in Conquest: Sexual violence and 
American Indian genocide, for a compelling analysis of how the rape of Native women is 
qualitatively different from the rape of both white women and black women.  Smith argues that 
the particular form that the rape of Native American women has taken is that of genocide; rape 
has been a key tactic used to eradicate Native peoples (7-33).  By contrast, rape of slave women 
served to increase the property holdings of slave-owners.  Thanks to Hypatia reader 1 for 
bringing this essay to my attention. 
<3> This concern was just raised, by Ofelia Schutte, at the fall 2009 Feminist Ethics and Social 
Theory (FEAST) Conference’s conversation “Are Academic Feminist Philosophies and 
Methodologies Still Too White?”.   
< 4> Funes is a fictional character created by author Jorge Luis Borges. Due to a brain injury, 
Funes can no longer categorize but is instead left with a plethora of unique, discrete, and hence 
incomprehensible experiences. 
<5> Kittay makes this point in her essay, Maternal thinking with a difference, pg. 163. 
<6> Personal conversation at the Feminist Ethics and Social Theory Conference, fall 2009, 
Clearwater Beach, Florida.  
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<7>  I take some steps towards developing a relational account of mothering in “Sara Ruddick, 
Transracial Adoption, and the Goals of Maternal Practice.” In that essay I discuss the changes in 
white parents necessitated by the desire to achieve the goals internal to and constitutive of 
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